In this essay I explore the account of imaginative phenomenology developed by Uriah Kriegel in The Varieties of Consciousness. On his view, the difference between perceptual phenomenology and imaginative phenomenology arises from the way that they present the existential status of their object: While perceptual experience presents its object as existent, imaginative experience presents its object as non-existent. While I agree with Kriegel that it’s likely that the difference between imaginative phenomenology and perceptual phenomenology is one not just of degree but of kind, I worry about the particular account that he has developed. I thus develop two lines of criticism. First, I question whether Kriegel is right that imagination presents its object as non-existent. Second, I question whether this account of imaginative phenomenology is consistent with other commonly-accepted facts about the nature of imagination.

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imaginative phenomenology existential status of

Amy Kind,.Imaginative Phenomenology and Existential Status. 7 (2),.

Amy Kind,"Imaginative Phenomenology and Existential Status" 7

Amy Kind,"Imaginative Phenomenology and Existential Status"